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SOME ASPECTS OF MAKERERE'S LEGAL
EDUCATION IN DEVELOPMENT*
D. Mabirizi**
In Lieu of an Introduction
Legal education at Makerere's Law Faculty has always been a highly
contentious matter. In the Faculty's first decade, argument seemed to
centre around the mechanics of instruction - as to whether, for example,
the case method was more effective than the lecture method., In the
second decade, the discussion has centred around more substantial theo-
retical and methodological issues. There has been an attempt to fathom
the substance of the basic legal education guidelines,' and actual ques-
tioning of the content of the syllabi and curricula, including their suitability
for Uganda. While the questioning has been multi-dimensional, space
allows here a concentration on only the education-in-development dimen-
sion.
The questions addressed herein are: To what extent has law-in-devel-
opment been accomplished; what has been the theoretical and practical
substance of the accomplishment; and what have been the attendant
problems. Here, too, the discussion will be limited and centred on the
Commercial Law Department with which the author is most familiar,
though in course of the discussion other departments which are part of
the same law faculty will necessarily be considered.
* We are aware of the extensive literature on law-in-development, which we cannot go into
here due to shortage of space. But it should be noted that we accept R. Seidman's definition of
development. See his TlE STATE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (1978), especially at 67-8.
** Formerly of Uganda's Law Development Centre; then of Makerere's Law Faculty; and
now of the Law Faculty, National University of Lesotho.
1. Argument over these matters showed up in varying staff seminars and faculty barazas in
the early 1970's.
2. GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM ON THE REPORT OF A COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO STUDY AND
MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING LEGAL EDUCATION, Entebbe: Govt. Printer, Session Paper No.
3 (1969) [hereinafter the GOVT. WHITE PAPER], and the Committee, the Gower Committee, which
produced the Gower Report.
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The paper will be divided into two major parts. The first part will
briefly discuss the theoretical and historical basis of law in development,
first, in the USA, and then in East Africa. The second part will consider
legal education in development at Makerere. Here we shall deal, first,
with the theoretical, and then with the practical issues.
I. Historical and Theoretical Basis of Law in Development
A. American Origins of Law in Development
The law in development movement seems to have arisen in the USA
in the 1950s as part of American missionary notions of helping the Third
World nations develop by sharing with them the know-how and modernity
of the USA. This had, in part, earlier given rise to Development Econom-
ics. The Law-in-Development movement was, in short, an attempt to
produce a development lawyer who, like other American development
scholars of the day, was to go to the Third World to help foster
development, but in this case through law.
The movement was coloured by anti-Communism and the Cold War
posture of the times and the need, therefore, to have the Third World
countries as areas with stable and predictable commercial transactions
within an implicit liberal capitalist sphere. The movement, it was thought,
would assist to enlarge and/or strengthen the American sphere of influence
through law.3 The movement also accorded well with the new post-war
balance of global economic forces, in which the USA emerged as the
most powerful Western nation, calling for free trade which would help it
penetrate those areas formerly controlled by European colonial powers,
notably Britain and France. It is important to remember that through the
Lendlease Agreement the USA aided Europe to recover from the war
devastation partly in return for an understanding that such free trade
would be allowed. 4
So, just as the (development) economists were asserting America's
right to free trade in former European spheres of influence-a really
subtle assertion of the right to dominate those spheres'-their development
lawyers were asserting the superiority of American legal education theory
3. A.J. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN
AMERICA 6 (1980).
4. See W.L. Clayton, in Foreword, C. WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE (1972); and
R. GARDNER, STERLING DOLLAR DIPLOMACY (1969).
5. This appears a reasonable interpretation in view of the American economic superiority over
the European Allies at the time.
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and methodology. Harvey's tone captures this intellectual mood thus:
At the risk of sounding provincial, I would assert categorically that
the philosophy and methodology of American legal education are more
responsive to the needs of Africa than anything Britain or France can
provide .6
It was in this spirit that the American legal-education-for-development
missionaries came to Africa and the Third World in general.
The legal theory that these missionaries brought with them was prag-
matic, rejected legal formalism and saw law as a means to particular
purposeful policy ends.7 It rejected any overriding philosophy of law, nay,
it bore a philosophy of law that was analytical and anti-philosophy.8
Pound explains this point thus:
The need of stability and certainty in the maturity of law and the
importance of social interests in security of acquisitions and security
of transactions in a commercial and industrial society, called for an
analytical rather than a philosophical method; the task of the jurist
was to perfect rather than to build anew. 9
Even assuming that the analytical model was the proper one for "a
commercial and industrial society," which is denied because the Third
World countries to which the law and development missionaries went were
not commercial or industrial, the theory was flawed from the very outset.
More fundamentally, while the Third World countries needed to rebuild
their socio-economic systems for the better, they were to be treated to
legal theory which sought to perfect what was found rather than build
anew; and with blissful ignorance of the socio-cultural and political systems
of the countries to which they went, only chaos would be the sequel. 0
But that is another story.
For now, we must note that this American legal theory was also
sociological, law being seen as a means of social control. All available
knowledge had to be brought to the task. This called for taking into
account "contributions which other disciplines and sciences can make to
6. W.B. Harvey, Final Report on the SAILER (Staffing of African Institutions for Legal
Education and Research Project, Ford Foundation Reports, New York.
7. A.J. Gardner, supra note 3, at 5-15 and ch. 3.
8. See Twining, Pericles and the Plumber, 83 L.Q.REv. 396, especially at 404-06 and 413-14
(1967).
9. R. POUND, TiH SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, 148-50, 210 (1930).
10. A.J. Gardner, supra note 3, at ch. I.
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the solution of social problems." 11 Thus, multi-disciplinary enquiry was
part of the kit the law-for-development missionaries carried to the Third
World. Its content as lawyerly craftsmanship is well summarized by
Llewelyn. Says he:
The essence of our craftsmanship lies in skills and wisdoms; in practical,
effective, persuasive, inventive skills for getting things done; any kind
of thing in any field .... We are the trouble shooters. 12
Thus it was apparently craftsmanship which entailed the study of law
not as a unity in its inter-connectedness, but as a craft pegged into a
myriad of other crafts, the other social sciences. 3 This was legal neo-
empiricism of sorts,' 4 which gave rise to the problem that many law-in-
development scholars felt they had to "balance" what they took from
the other social sciences so that legal education was not overrun by them
but remained legal in its own right. We shall see that the problem showed
up in Makerere's law-in-development approach, but more of this later.
For now, we must turn to see, first, how the law-in-development movement
unfolded in East Africa in order to appreciate later on its specific character
at Makerere.
B. Early East African Law in Development
For a long time, East Africa had no local or systemised legal educa-
tion. 1" This was partly because under the then operative Indirect Rule
system, customary law that governed the activities of most Africans was
dealt with in the native courts which allegedly needed no lawyers, and
also partly because it was feared that legal education might strengthen
and help articulate anti-Colonial demands. 6
In the wake of modernisation and continuing nationalist pressure, the
need for legal education became clear. The groundwork was prepared by
the London Conference on the Future of Law in Africa. 7 While the
11. Currie, The Materials of Law Study, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 333-5 (1951), as quoted in Twining,
supra note 8.
12. See K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 316 (1962).




16. L.C.B. GOWER, INDEPENDENT AFRICA: THE CHALLENGE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 111
(1967).
17. A.N. Alott (ed.), The Future of Law in Africa, RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
LONDON CONFERENCE, 28th December, 1959 - 8th January 1960 46-53 (1960).
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politicians were shaping the constitutions through Lancaster House Con-
ferences, the legal educators were busy formulating legal education policy
in London.
The London Conference showed concern for lack of local legal edu-
cation in the Commonwealth countries and recommended the setting up
of a committee to study the matter more closely. Thus came the Denning
Committee, which pointed out the need to set up local facilities that
would produce future lawyers well grounded in their national law. 8 Not
much, however, seems to have been said about law-in-development as
such, a matter which was not yet particularly popular within British legal
education. 19
However, when, following the Lockwood Report on Higher Education
in East Africa, it was suggested that a Faculty of Law be established at
Dar es Salaam from October 1961, the law-in-development theory quickly
came with the American legal education missionaries, whose origins we
have seen. This was so though the first staff was essentially of British
background, 20 and the school, at first, a College of London University. 21
Indeed, just as the British granted political independence and left East
Africa open to American influence, so did they open the law school and
leave it open to American law in development legal education steeped in
pragmatic sociological jurisprudence. Thus, Rockefeller, the Maxwell Cen-
tre at Syracuse, SAILER (Staffing of African Institutions for Legal
Education and Research), the American Program for Cooperation in
African Legal Education and Research and other American agencies
supported the American legal missionaries at Dar in varying ways. They
supplied American staff, books and scholarships to train future African
law teachers in American law schools. 22
Soon Dar produced American-style casebooks23 and teaching materials
that often bore extracts from other social sciences as well. This accorded
well with the spirit of sharing American legal education expertise with
East Africa. However, more specifically interesting for purposes of this
18. See Report of the Committee On Legal Education For Students From Africa (1961), cmnd.
1255.
19. We have endeavoured to explain this elsewhere. See Mabirizi, supra note 13, at 18-24.
20. Faculty of Law at Dar es Salaam, 5 J. AFR. L. 73 (1961); 6 J. AFR. L. 151 (1962).
21. Id. at 152-5.
22. See Allott, American Program for Cooperation in African Legal Education and Research,
5 J. AFR. L. 121 (1961); J. BAINBRIDGE, STUDY AND TEACHING OF LAW IN AFRICA (1972); Johnstone,
American Assistance to African Legal Education, 46 TUL. L. REV. 657 (1972).
23. E.g. I.R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS IN EAST AFRICA: INSTRUMENTS FOR SOCIAL CO-OPERATION
(1968).
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discussion was Robert Seidman's Law and Development course. There he
argued that law, a value-neutral tool, could be used to effect development,
to remove poverty and oppression. 24 He went to great length to prepare
his materials to suit the local conditions, but at times the students found
his course cumbersome because it required not only the knowledge of the
rules of law but also a pragmatic application of the law to the local
development problems. It was perhaps an exemplification of the "balanc-
ing problem" produced by American multi-method law-in-development
theory as already suggested. To be sure, the students seemed to prefer
the somewhat straight British-style law lectures which simply discussed
statutes, cases and reforms from the rules as such. These lectures were,
indeed, what a number of law teachers with a strong British background
preferred. They also did not bother themselves much with law-in-devel-
opment.
Be that as it may, by 1965 it was clear that the Faculty was to teach
law in its social, economic and historical contexts, in an approach con-
cerned with development and with the production of lawyers for societies
in revolution. 25 This vision as summarised by William Twining seemed to
differ from that of the conservative American pragmatic one earlier seen,
pointing to the reality of theoretical differences in law-in-development.
However, Twining was still speaking within the stream of a law-in-
development environment much-shaped by American legal education meth-
odology. In short, anyhow, it seemed Dar was to teach all its law for
development .26
II. Makerere's Law in Development
A. A Note on the Official Guidelines
When Makerere's Law Faculty was born in 1968, it, too, was to
research and teach law in social and economic context. The position was
spelled out by the Gower Committee Report, which stated that the function
of University legal education is "to produce men with an understanding
of the role of law in society, and a deep and thorough grounding in legal
principles. ' 27 Government basically accepted this position thus:
24. See T.W. Hutchison, Law and Development in Independent English-speaking Sub-Saharan
Africa, in AFRICA AND LAW (1968).
25. Twining, Legal Education Within East Africa, EAST AFRICAN LAW TODAY (1965).
26. Id.; but see Yash Ghai, Goals of African Legal Education: Comment," in HAILE SELASSIE
(Vanderlindern ed.), Addis, 1968.
27. Gower Report, supra note 2.
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The law student must be made constantly aware that legal rules do
not operate in a vacuum but in a specific social and economic
development, that law is not a self-contained system but part of the
social process, that it is not enough to consider any problem or
situation from a purely legal point of view without at the same time
showing the students its social implications .... We need facts and
well-informed and balanced views of society, and we must know how
relevant behaviour is affected by legal rules.2"
Law was, therefore, to be studied with regard to its "historical, economic,
social and political influence in the country." 29 More of this later. First
we shall see that the interpretation of these guidelines has recently not
been a very happy exercise.
B. Makerere's Law in Development, 1968-80
In the early years of the Faculty, a number of Ugandan law teachers
returned to Makerere from abroad. These were people who had been
graduated at Dar, and had subsequently pursued graduate study in Amer-
ican law schools. They enhanced law-in-development legal education meth-
odology, as they were interested in teaching law for development in their
courses. In fact, some of them even produced American-style teaching
materials that relied partly on the other social sciences.30 Hardly any of
them, however, questioned the theoretical framework, which in typical
American pragmatical style was essentially analytical, and intended to
perfect the law rules within their status quo. Hardly any of them ques-
tioned the law's socio-economic foundations for building anew, for social
transformation for the better.31 The history of the law (and its social
environment) was treated but usually as mere background material. 2 There
remained a number, however, who, in the typical British style earlier
adverted to, did not concern themselves with law-in-development.
In this mix of legal education methodology, the ambition to teach law
for development was not always well articulated. This situation continued
until 1980 when there was something of a theoretical explosion.
28. See Govt. White Paper, supra note 2, para. 18.
29. Gower Report, supra note 2, at para. 37, approved in Govt. White Paper, supra note 2.
30. E.g., THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANISATIONS IN EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA, (Katende,
Chesterman, Thomas and Mann eds.), Nairobi: EALB, 1976.
31. This point must not be misunderstood. The author does not doubt that the Makerere Law
Faculty staff was a very good one, and that even their works were very well done. What is being
questioned is the theoretical framework that animated their work.
32. Indeed, in many teaching materials, the history only appeared briefly at the beginning.
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1986
C. Makerere's Law in Development 1980-85
1. General
At the centre of the storm were two questions: First, there was the
question whether all law was to be taught in a law-in-development frame-
work. Second, there was the question, assuming that if any law-in-
development was to be taught at all, what law-in-development theory was
to be applicable. Two major "schools of thought" emerged. For ease of
reference, we shall refer to one as the Legalistic school, and the other as
the Commercial Law school. We must now turn to consider each group
separately.
2. The Legalistic School
This school argued that while Uganda's legal education could concern
itself with development, the Government's position was that emphasis at
the faculty had to be upon the rules of law as such.33 The argument was,
in part, based on the allegation that most law students aimed at careers
in legal practice.34 It was, further, based on the wording of the Government
White Paper on the Gower Report, especially paragraph 9 which quoted
Professor Parry as stating that
[lI]aw is a living and practical thing. It can and indeed should be
studied to some extent in the abstract. But a man is not a lawyer
unless he can and does put his knowledge to use by practising the
law. As a consequence, the teacher must always have an eye on
practice, be it public or private practice in the courts, or the sort of
office practice the government lawyer has accustomed us to.
Also relied on was paragraph 18 of the White Paper, which, while
accepting the broad-based law-in-context approach suggested by the Gower
Committee, also stated that the function of University legal education was
to produce men with "a deep and thorough grounding in legal principles."
The same paragraph also seemed to suggest that the social circumstances
related to law were to be taught only in order to sharpen the law students'
practical ability.35 It, therefore, appeared that on the whole there was no
basis for teaching all the law at the Faculty from the law-in-development
perspective.
33. See Mabirizi, supra note 13, at 36-41.
34. See E. Khiddu-Makubuya, Jurisprudence as a law course at Makerere, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE DAR/MAKERERE SUBJECT MEETING, DECEMBER 14-17, 1983, Faculty of Law, Dar es Salaam,
1984.
35. See Govt. White Paper, supra note 2, at 6.
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However, if there was to be any law-in-development teaching at all,
its purpose should, inter alia, be to help produce a Third World policy
maker, articulate in legal craftsmanship, who would not only be able to
make law conform to desired policies, but who would also out-maneuvre
the developed country's lawyers in contractual and other negotiations.
36
To do that it was necessary to go into the law rules as such, and, even,
delve into such matters as drafting documents. One would have thought,
however, that under Uganda's legal education set-up these very profes-
sional practical matters were to be mainly left to the Law Development
Centre. This would leave more time to the faculty for theoretical rigour.
Above all, it appears that this approach trivialised problems of under-
development to the level of mere legalistic negotiation.
History was conceded as important to describe past trends, but insis-
tence on history was described as "historicism" in a "Popperian" fash-
ion.37 Further, other social sciences were also important but the task of
a law faculty was the teaching of law. In any case, it was suggested that
the law teacher was usually not competent to go into the other social
sciences, which were themselves full-fledged courses. The problem of
"balancing" law with the other social sciences - earlier referred to - thus
reared its head. Law was seen as law; it was accorded a status independent
of the stream of society, its policy and economy, of which it was (and
is) but a part. As an inevitable corollary, the law's socio-economic content
was to be seen, if at all, as matter apart, in the other compartments of
the other social sciences. So the false3" theoretical problem of balancing
had to arise.
It was, further, said that if law was to be studied as a science, it was
to be examined within the context of that which was workable and useful
for society, and for the purpose of making practical suggestions regarding
practical developmental (and other) problems. "Abstract" questioning
(i.e. philosophy) of legal phenomena had to be eschewed.3 9
This was a subtle reproduction of the American pragmatic analytical
mode140 of law-in-development with an unmistakable conservative content.
36. Aspects of this appear in E. Khiddu-Makubuya, id., and in his critical review of D.W.
NABUDERE, POLITICA ECONOMY OF IMPERIALISM, Zed (1977).
37. See M. CORNFORTH, THE OPEN PHILOSOPHY AND THE OPEN SOCIETY (1968).
38. The problem was theoretically false if we agree that law has, ultimately, no life apart from
that of society which produces it. See Sol Picciotto, Law, Life and Politics in THE LIMITS OF LEGAL
RADICALISM (I. Shivji, ed.) 36 at 47, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam (1987).
39. Mabirizi, supra note 13, at 40-44.
40. J.D. Bernal's indictment of pragmatism remains relevant. See his SCIENCE IN HISTORY 791-
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If history was (purely) descriptive, and there was to be no philosophy,
questions of how and why the law had come to be what it was were not
to be gone into as questions on dynamic material, if at all. If the analysis
was to be confined to the existing "workable and useful," the status quo
could well be maintained. Moreover, if "the practical" was not based on
the questioning of the foundations, it could only be the practical within
the status quo.
3. The Commercial Law School
(a) The Theoretical Arguments
This school expressed the views of the overwhelming majority of law
teachers in the Commercial Law Department. The school argued that
first, law as such, without the social and economic conditions giving rise
to it or interacting with it or in whose milieu it operates, cannot be
meaningfully taught or learned except as a lifeless abstraction. They further
argued that if the faculty was to produce lawyers who not merely parroted
the rules of law but were helpful participants in Uganda's struggle to
develop, this conceptualization of law was a must.4' This argument was
buttressed by Government's having accepted the broad law-in-context
approach of the Gower Committee already referred to. Moreover, those
who drafted the Gower Report were aware that in the new nations of
Africa the lawyers' tasks were broader than those customarily associated
with lawyers in England and other Common Law countries; they knew
that apart from the traditional practice jobs, these new lawyers would be
called upon to play important roles in politics, commerce, administration,
in short, in the development process itself. 42 The Makerere law graduates,
therefore, were to be not just narrow legal technicians but "broad" legal
engineers 43 capable of doing the traditional "technical" legal work as well.
92 (1965), where he says that pragmatism's founder, William James, "took his science from
evolutionary biology, particularly from the abuse of the doctrine of survival of the fittest. It was
good to survive, therefore what led to survival must be good and the way itself must be the true
one. Truth was what worked and paid off. This doctrine had the convenience of throwing the cloak
of philosophic approval over church going and money making alike. It was, thanks to John
Dewey... destined to be the basis of American liberal thought and education. For all its advanced
character, it was scientifically empty and morally bankrupt .. "
41. J.A.S. Musisi, The Teaching of Law in The Third World: The Case of Makerere (mimeo),
Commercial Law, Makerere, 1980.
42. Gower Report, supra note 2, at para. 2.
43. Echoing Twining, supra note 8, at n. 8.
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To realise this aim the Gower Committee had, indeed, emphasised
that "legal subjects should only be taught in terms of political and social
history, and their social and economic environment."
In this way, it was argued, the Committee had aimed at producing a
development lawyer of sorts. This point was emphasised in the Commit-
tee's tentative syllabus, which was broad and embodied an unmistakable
element of law-in-development. There was, for example, to be a course
on Introduction to Modern African History and Politics, which would
examine, inter alia, current social and political problems, social and
political change in Uganda and methods of social and political change.
There was to be a course on Law and Economics in East Africa and a
course on Economic Development and the Law, which would teach
community development, economic planning and their legal implications,
etc. Land law was to consider, among other things, land use and agri-
cultural development. Government had noted this syllabus with interest
but hoped that the University, in shaping the curriculum, would be guided
by paragraphs 10-20 of its White Paper. These, in essence, required a
curriculum which would produce men (and women) with an understanding
of the role of law in society and a deep and thorough grounding in legal
principles .41
In short, to the Commercial Law school, there was no doubt that all
law taught at the Faculty was to have a law-in-development content. The
Commercial Law Department, therefore, went ahead and infused a law-
in-development content in its courses. We must now turn to see the nature
of the theory that informed this infusion, how it was actually effectuatued
and some of the problems encountered.
(b) Commercial Law's Law in Development
(i) Summary of the Practice
Foremost, the Department rejected the American pragmatic model,
which it found theoretically flawed 46 and unsuitable for Uganda's devel-
opment demands. It, then, attempted to analyse legal concepts historically,
using the explanatory power of Political Economy. History here was not
just descriptive but dynamic and philosophical, and, like the Political
Economy, it was not merely background material, but an integral part of
44. Gower Report, supra note 2, at para. 37.
45. Govt. White Paper, supra note 2, at para. 18.
46. Musisi, supra note 41.
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1986
the legal material it discussed. With this monistic model, the false problem
of "balancing" law with the social sciences did not arise. 47
A legal concept would be described, then traced historically, and its
meaning under changing socio-economic conditions unearthed. The pur-
pose was, as in all science, to seek the "law" and forces that govern the
movement of the concept. The socio-economic circumstances were, as
much as possible, seen in their interconnection and unity and not in
separate compartments. In this way, law was seen as part of the dynamic
socio-economic process, and its dialectical unity with its socio-economic
circumstances was restored. 48 The other social sciences, we reiterate, were
thus made use of as integral parts of the matter being discussed, not as
separate matters or sciences. In discussing freedom of contract, for
example, the dynamics of competitive industrialism, laissez faire and
atomism it stood for would be probed not as Political Science, Philosophy
or Economics, but as parts of this freedom of contract they gave rise to
and stood with. 49
With the legal concept understood, it would be demonstrated and
probed through an examination of the statuses and cases. Again, this was
done in light of the socio-economic circumstances, especially as to how it
affected and was affected by these circumstances. Statute and case law
would, however, not respond in every tiny detail to the socio-economic,
historical milieu, but it would always respond to the internal unity of the
legal system, which had to be delved into fully. Therefore, no attempt
was made to see in every tiny detail of the law the social and economic
environment and thus force law into what would otherwise amount to
mere determinism. The law was here, then, simply followed to its internal
web, thereby acquainting the student with all its technicalities and contexts.
The method would be explained to the student in detail within ap-
proximately the first two weeks of class. After this he would be required
to use it to prepare for class and eventually to make case studies or
prepare other research papers.
(ii) Some Problems
The major problem was the paucity of teaching materials. The tradi-
tional texts were inadequate, mainly because they lacked depth for pur-
47. Those who charged the Department with having problems of balancing were simply
transferring their theoretical difficulties to the Department. See supra note 38.
48. It had apparently been taken away by American Pragmatism.
49. See Mabirizi, supra note 13, pp. 44-48. See issues raised by R.W. Tenga, The Historical
and Socio-economic Approaches in Learning the Law: Dar es Salaam and Third World Perspectives
in Jurisprudence, in supra note 38, at 95-116.
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poses of our methodology and bore hardly any developmental content for
Uganda's conditions. There were, of course, a few texts, like Holdsworth,50
which proved invaluable but of these there were usually not enough copies
to go round. Thus, the search, especially initially, for proper sources
demanded a lot of time, both for the student and the lecturer, time which,
in the quest for knowledge, had to be found. In fact, it was amazing
how resourceful students could be.
There was no doubt that the solution to the problem was for the
lecturers to produce the needed teaching materials. However, this was and
is bound to be slow because of the heavy teaching loads on the staff.
Nevertheless, over the last five years, a sizeable amount of material has
been developed.
Another problem was the Faculty Administration, which thought that
the approach was rather strange and was not really teaching law but
Political Economy. This was but a reflection of theoretical problems as
regards the content of law, a problem to which reference has already been
made. However, thanks to the liberal academic tradition of the University,
the Commercial Law Department was able to continue its work.
Indeed, to the Department, no strangeness was found in the method,
which increasingly produced good results and work commended by external
examiners, both as regards the purely legal technicalities and the devel-
opmental dimension. The most successful courses were Commercial Law
1I,11 in which results in the seventies had been rather poor, and Business
Associations.5 2 So well understood were these courses that the students
produced rich research papers (usually case studies) on the character of
the law in the developmental context of Uganda. The papers usually
examined how the law was being applied in the field and established some
conclusions on the results of this application for Uganda's development,
conclusions which pointed not only to the need for specified legal reform
but also to the limitations of the law, in development.
Commercial Law I," though successful at the level of teaching the
legal technicalities, was less successful at the level of theoretically explain-
ing those rules within the stream of the Department's development theory
referred to earlier. It was found that this was due partly to the fact that
Commercial Law I's material, especially its Sale of Goods, was perhaps
50. W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1936-66).
51. Le., Banking and Insurance.
52. Le. Company Law, Partnership, Co-operatives and Public Corporations.
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more abstract, under Uganda's socio-econoomic conditions, than that of
Banking and Insurance in the other Commercial Law course and that of
Business Associations. While the practical content of the law in the latter
courses was relatively easy to demonstrate from the real world, this was
not always the case as regards the content of that in Commercial Law I.
This was pointed up partly by the fact that though there had been a trend
of the weak students in the other Commercial Law courses sloganeering
bits and pieces of Political Economy, there were apparently more such
students in Commercial Law I.
This sensitised the Department to the fact that the selection of teaching
materials in Commercial Law I-as, indeed, in all the other courses-had
to be done more carefully. This also pointed to the need for the Depart-
ment to develop expertise in passing on the material to the students, using
the methodology. The Department also realised that without such exper-
tise, there was a clear danger that because the integration of the material
was not always so easy, the weak student could pick up only the bits and
pieces easy to appreciate, which pieces, because they would be inadequate,
deteriorated to the level of mere slogans. Further, because finding the
material was difficult, especially at the beginning, getting the students to
be active participants in the learning process was not always easy, a
problem that would also partly explain the sloganeering.
In this connection, there was, also, those one or two cases in which
the stronger student ended up merely sloganeering, or performed generally
poorly. Such cases were no doubt statistically insignificant, but the De-
partment did not see its students as mere statistics. There was thus the
question whether poor performance was the Department's creation in such
cases, especially because of having introduced a very demanding method
(under the difficult economic conditions then prevailing in the country).
However, there was the cotsolation that the better students always opted
for the Department's courses, a sign, perhaps, that its theoretical frame-
work addressed burning questions not otherwise addressed by the other.54
Another problem was that the curricula as spelled out in the University
regulations were vague in that they usually just stated the broad areas of
law to be covered, and sometimes added that these were to be covered in
the social and economic setting of the country. It became necessary,
therefore, to prepare fairly detailed course outlines spelling out the lec-
turer's interpretation of the curricula. The trouble was that sometimes
54. Of course part of the explanation is also that Commercial Law I was compulsory. Besides
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this detailedness was said, especially by the weak students, to be going
beyond the syllabus. Therefore, it appeared that the curricula needed
rewriting, but this was not always easy to steer through the Faculty Board
because, as suggested above, the Faculty Administration did not favour
the Department's approach."
Finally, though the Department did not doubt the correctness of its
theoretical framework, there was the unfortunate fact that the results of
its methodology would be slow in getting back to it (i.e. the Department).
In terms of professional competence and awareness of the problems of
developing the country through law, what kind of lawyer had the De-
partment actually produced? This information was needed to assist in
reassessment and sharpening of the methodology. Otherwise, the accusa-
tion sometimes made that the Department was experimenting blindly on
its students would persist and continue to complicate the operational
environment. By 1985 the Department was beginning to hear from some
former students and their employers from the Judiciary, the Attorney
General's Chambers, the private practice, and parastatal organizations. It
appeared that Commercial Law was producing lawyers knowledgeable in
the law and useful in the all-demanding development process of their
country.
However, needless to say, there remains a need to begin a systematic
research project on the impact of Commercial Law's methodology and to
discern its shortcomings (as well as its advantages) with some precision.
Meaningful theory must constantly be fed on practice.
III. Conclusion
Law-in-development at Makerere was initially part of the American
sociological, pragmatic legal education tradition received through Dar es
Salaam from the American law-and-development missionaries of the 1960's.
In the first decade of the Faculty, it was never well articulated. It was
always stated that law was to be taught in social and economic context.
What this really meant was never clear.
Around 1980, the Commercial Law Department interpreted this to
mean that law-in-development as a methodology would permeate the entire
teaching of law in the Faculty. The Department also saw this as demanding
the teaching of rules of law in social, economic and historical context,
55. Some amendments to the Contract and Commercial Law syllabi were able to go through,
but they were of minor nature.
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informed by Political Economy, in order to produce lawyers who not
only knew the technicalities of the law, but also understood them in their
context, and appreciated the law's role in development. The vision was
that of producing a lawyer who could help rebuild Uganda's society for
the better. This interpretation was denied by other colleagues in the
Faculty, who saw the primary purpose of the Faculty as teaching law as
such, as rules, in order to prepare students for practice, where, it was
alleged, most of them wanted to go. These colleagues felt that if law for
development was to be taught, in appropriate subjects, it was in order,
essentially, to help produce lawyers who could provide practical solutions
to practical problems, in the image, that is, of the typical American
policy-oriented problem-solver. This, we have argued, was a subtle repro-
duction of American conservative pragmatism, which was not appropriate
for Uganda's society, which was trying to move itself forward. However,
the specifics of the operationalization of this pragmatic law-in-development
have not been gone into for lack of details.
It is into the actualisation of the Commercial Law Department's law-
in-development that we have gone. Here, we have seen that there have
been problems of shortage of, and finding and tailoring of, appropriate
material; difficulties of developing expertise to communicate the material,
especially to the weak students; difficulties with the Faculty Administra-
tion, and difficulties of getting feedback on the Department's products.
Perhaps, the most serious difficulty was that of developing expertise
to tailor, develop and communicate the material, but it was, and is,
expertise, which did not, and does not, have to develop out of another
formal course. The experiences and lessons that exist must be exchanged
between Faculties or Departments teaching in similar manners; they must
be analysed and harnessed into better law-in-development legal education
methodology. This, like development itself, must be an endless process.
